The Kobe-Hanshin Earthquake was the world-first seismic desaster with about 6,050 victims and 40 group fires basically caused by the collapse of about 46,000 lowrise and 3,000 middle or high rise buildings, which occurred in the midst of mordern technological urban areas. Destroyed highway and jammed up main roads made supporting fire engines unable to access fire sites. City fire hydrants were almost ineffective, because their piping systems was broken. This paper shows the outline of fire disasters and implements a concept on the limitation of group fire by constructing urban fire compartment. The author indicates the compartmentation must be mostly composed of improved aged-houses and buildings, because remodelling of inhabited district is quite hard. And the results of investigations warned that highly damaged fire equipments and facilities revealed the fire safety of building itself quite serious in a large earthquake. Through various studies,several important countermeasures are proposed in this paper.
INTRODUCTION

OUTLINE OF THE KOBE-HANSHIN EARTHQUAKE 1) The strong seismic motion
The Kobe-Hanshin Earthquake was the world-first strong intraplate earthquake that hit directly the centrum of a modern developed city.The distribution of epicenters of main shocks concentrated around 3 4 . 36.4'N,135. 2.6'E where locate offshore along Nojima fault systems between Kobe and Awazi Is. as shown in FIGURE 1.According to the Japan Meteorological Agency(JMA)Kobe Obsevatory, the depths of the shocks are around l0km.The magnitude was 7.2 on the Richter scale.The maximum peak acceleration 818 gal in the North-South direction and 332gal in the Up-Down direction were recorded respectively, And in several places, the value of U-D motion was greater than that of hori-zontal motion.For example, vertical 507galhorizontal 319gal at Takenaka corpolation ob-sevatory and vertical 367gal-horizontal 300gal at Kobe university basement obsevatory.Thedistribution of seismic intensity VII is also shown in FIGURE 1 [1] . The intensity VII 'ruin-ous' is determined by the Jh4A on the lessons at the Fukui earthquake in 1948[note.l].In this connection,the intensity VI 'disastrous' was recorded in Toky, district at the GreatKanto Earthquake in 1923 [ 
2) Human Damages
Approximately 4,950 fatalities occurred by the destruction of aged wood houses.From the autoptical point of view,about 550 victims were burnt to death in their collapsed houses [2] . About 70% of deaths occurred in Kobe City, especially at both the eastern and the western part of the city [3] .In addition,it is also quite important thatabout 600 peoples were dead by posttraumatic stress disorder or lack of enough medical cares after the earthquake[4] [5] , which means total fatalities caused by the Kobe earthquake should be recognized to reach approximately 6,100 [6] .Fatalities in past earthquakes are recorded as shown in TABLE 1. [7] . The table indicates that the rate of destroyed one or two storied buildings was 9.4%(46,022) in comparison with more than three storied buildings of 6.4% (3, 081) .The total rate of damaged buildings is estimated 87.46%(489,276) for lowrise and 8.67%(48,519) for more than three storied buildings.Severa1 characteristic features were seen in the collapse of traditional houses with lack of structural soundness for seismic motion as shown in FIGURE 2, decay of wood strucural members and heavyweight of roof tiles called 'Kawara' in Japanese, and the collapse of middle story of middle-rise buildings,because the seismic motion was amplified there, structural materials and/or components was changed just at that story and so on. TABLE 3 shows a brief histrory of legal revision on wood structure in Japan& seems that the rate of non-damaged houses linearly increased along with their aging as shoun in FIG-URE 3 [16] . The number of fire occurrences is shown in Group fires were mainly caused by the collapse of houses which formed continuous piles of broken wood fuels to make a bridge for spreading fire across road,and also caused by flaming up of markets with above-road combustible arcades, of chemical shoes-factories with much amount of both plastics and flammable adhesives, and shortage of firefighting water [11] [12] .The number of conflagrations burnt over 33,000m was 5,group fires over 10,000 m was 14,and fires burnt over 3,300m 2 was 21[11] [12] . These group fires were mostly concentrated in pre-adjusted densely inhabited districts where there exist narrow paths less than 4m in width and collapsed old houses or tenements constructed over 50 years before, and these factors made an easiness to grow up fire by radiation or flying brands.Fortunately, when the earthquake occurred,wind speed was less than 4m/s,and the rate of fire spread was not accelerated. The average speed of group fire spreading was estimated approximately 20
-40 m/h for leeward side at wind speed 1 -3m/s and also 40 -75mh at 3 -4m/s. As for past large fires,the average spreading speed was recorded 100 -150mh at wind speed 10 -12m/s in the Sakata city conflagration on 31 Oct.,1976 and also 200 -300mh at 8 m/s in the Great Kanto Earthquake fire on 1 Sep.,1923 [13] . In this situation,the ratio of barriers effective against fire spreading were generally 40% as of road, 23% each as of open space and fire protective buildings or houses, and 14% as of fire fighting activities[l4].As for windows of houses which remained in safety around group fire areas, the ratio of each ---case of houses whose claddings were considerably burnt, the ratio of remained mesh-wired glass, parallel-wired glass and regular glass were about 75%, 17% and 13% respectively as shown in FIGURE 6 [15] . In non-fire areas with seismic intensity VII, the rate of windows whose houses were partly damaged were 68% as of non damaged,l7% as of deformed,l2% 
3) Damages of fire facilities and equipments in buildings
Fire equipments such as alam,sprinkler,telecommunication,hydrant,and emergency generator were considerably damaged in the earthy.ake.In Kobe,there were 4,556 buildings which legally need to install sprinkler systems. Among of them, 544 sprinkler-installed buildings were investigated by the Kobe Fire Department. These floor areas were less than 1,000 m2 as of 19 bldgs, 1,000 -3,000m2 as of 98 bldgs,3,000 -6,000m2 as of 129 bldgs and more than 6,000mz as of 296 bldgs,and stories were less than 5 as of 273 bldgs,6 -10 as of 172 bldgs,ll -15 as of 58 bldgs, 16 --20 as of 7 bldgs and more than 21 as of 16 bldgs. The department reports as shown in [17] . Those high rate of damages were also witnessed in othcr earthquakes.For example,the rate of damage of sprinkler systems was 56% (38168 bldgs) in San Fernando earthquake (M 6.6) on 9 Feb.,1971[18], and 41% (18144 bldgs) in Hachinohe city by the Sanriku Haruka Oki earthquake(M 7.5), Japan,on 28 Dec.,1994, when 30 heads of sprinkler systems effectively exinguished quake-fire on the 2nd floor in a commercial building with 5 stories and total floor area 3,911m2 [19] . The rate of damage of expansion joints was 100% at higher floor level of 5 --10th and 65% of lower floor level, and water pipes or erectric cables poked through fire compartment were mostly in safety by their own flexibility [20] . Earthquake fire experiences have not been seriously revealed in buildings so far,but it seems to be of importance that some appropriate preparedness should be taken into practice,because thehigh rate of damage of fire related equipments must be a symptom of coming tragedy. Through this earthquake,a great deal of lessons were accumulated concerning building and urban firesafety design,which are as follows.
water damage = 41(28/68) (1) It is inherent to keep aged houses in safety against seismic attacks for reducing risk of deaths and group fire. (2) Fire origins were dispersed homogeneously in the area of seismic intensity VII. The main reason seems that some combustible materials were ignited by recovered electric energy.And the timing for recovery must be of importance. (3) Destruction of densely inhabited districts mixed with chemical shoes factories accelerated spread of group fire, and remodelling of these inner city areas should be one of urgent considerations. (4) Although fire spread at slow speed in the Kobe case,wind must be the most careful factor for restraining group fire. (5) Open spaces such as park, railway area, river and continuous ow of buildings were effective as fire barrier. (6) Almost city fire hydrants were useless mainly because of destruction of plumbing systems and cisterns.Besides school pools, old well were helpful beyond expectation. Besides,wireless telephone systems were useful for peoples' urgent communication.
Through considering the above mentioned lessons which are shaped in 
A CONCEPT ON BUILDING FIRESAFETY DESIGN TO URBAN FIRE PREVENTION 1) Fire protection of buildings
The fire in an individual building caused by seismic motion must be taken into consideration.In strong motion,several fires are subject to occur in a building at the same time,and if occurred in the daytime,many people might Le fata1.A concept on building firesafety design against large earthquake would be formed according to the following steps, which are also shown in TABLE 7. The first step is to classify the intensity of seismic motions. They are divided into two levels. The intensity level of V -VI means an earthquake of this level will expect to occur one or two times through the existence of the concerned building, and the level of more than VII: an earthquake of this level will scarecely expect to occur on time through the existence of the concerned building.Thesecond step is to classify buildings which would be divided into 2 types according to theiroccupancy or height.High rise building of over 60 meters means this building will be expected to have no damages of fire related facilities or equipments against intensity level ofV --V1,and also no damages of main fire related facilities or equipments by intensity level of more than VII. Buildings relating to disaster prevention activities such as city hall, fire orpolice department building, school, hospital and home for handicapped people will be expected no damages of fire facilities or equipments against any seismic intensity level. Privatebuildings or apartment houses will be expected to have no damages of main fire facilities orequipments against any seismic intensity level. In an apartment fire,an evacuee could not escape and burnt to death because only one entrance door was fixed and unable to move caused by deformation of the frame,which means a door should be installed free from seismic motion. In other cases,furnitures, household goods,hydrant hose were dispersed on around a hall or corridor,which made difficulties of peoples' evacuation. (2) Seismic free design for fire equipments Fire equipments such as sprinkler,emergency generator were damaged with high rate, and if the earthquake occurred in the daytime, it could induce more serious conditions to in-building peoples.Pipes poked through expansion joint were partly damaged.However, they had been safe, if they would have been installed according to the guideline which recommends plumbing should be enough flexible to seimic deformation with the angle of l n O O -1/100 between two floors [23] . As shown in previou Several buildings were survived by sett1.1g some noncombustible materials or splashing water over their windows.Even in these cases, a building behind the others or glazing reinforced by wire were more effective.This means double rows of protected buildings would be useful for fire barriers.
3) Basic concept on fire compartmentation in urban area
Urban areas are classified here by the following 5 types for the prevention of group fire.
And they are shaped in 
4) Improvement o r construction of emergency information systems
One of the main causes of occurrence of group fire was induced in the chaos of initial fire informations.For instance,remote controlled cameras set on the top of buildings, failed just after the strong motion,because of erectric interruption [22] .Remote sensing must be necessary for fire fighting.In the future,fire activities will be performed on a vertual reality stage or cyberspace. Technology on creating cyberspace will be one of the most interesting and important subjects. Fire control is carried out at the fire management center, where in general unable to see a real fire, and what should be 'reality' in a screen image or human brains might be indispensable for elevating the quality of firesafety design.
5) Improvement of city gas and water supply systems
One of the most important issues was focused on the fire resistivity of city gas supply systems. Combination of gas leakage with return supply of erectric power seemed to make an outbreak of fire, which means that gas piping should be flexible especially at the inducing point into a house or building, and blocking of piping networks is indispensable for the reduction of gas disaster. And almost city water services were interupted, because of destruction of a reservoir and strait piping systems, which means also that it is quite important to grade up the seismic resistivity of reservior and to make piping systems pararell. Other systems by using sea or deep underground water might have been useful for the Kobe case.
